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INTRODUCTION
When does attorney–client privilege protect communications
between an attorney and her client’s former employee? Unfortunately, there
is no simple answer to this question. In federal courts, privilege over
communications with current employees is generally governed by the
subject-matter test.1 Under this legal doctrine, communication is privileged
when it regards subject matter within the scope of the employee’s position.
The rationale for the doctrine is that it is often the lower-level employees
who will have the information that an attorney needs. Extending the
doctrine to former employees, however, has caused courts to stumble as
they have attempted to reconcile evidentiary privilege and the corporate
entity. The difficulty reconciling these two theories has resulted in a split
among courts as to what the scope of privilege should be with former
employees.
Attorneys will increasingly face circumstances where
communication with a former employee is necessary. This is a function of
at least three trends. First, the workforce turnover rate is significantly
higher for the current generation than it was for past generations.2 Second,
the backlog of cases in federal courts is continuing to grow, increasing the
median wait-time.3 And third, the increasingly complex regulatory
environment that businesses operate in makes it necessary for corporate
attorneys to access a wide range of corporate knowledge in order to give
fully informed legal advice.4 The consequence is that an employee is more
1. See generally 1 Paul R. Rice, ATTORNEY–CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES
§ 4:14 (2011); John W. Gergacz, ATTORNEY–CLIENT § 3:94 (3d ed. 2013).
2. Susan J. Becker, Discovery of Information and Documents from a Litigant’s
Former Employees: Synergy and Synthesis of Civil Rules, Ethical Standards, Privilege
Doctrines, & Common Law Principles, 81 NEB. L. REV. 868, 872 (2003) (citing Peralta v.
Cendant Corp., 190 F.R.D. 38, 39 (D. Conn. 1999)); Jakob v. Champion Int’l Corp., No. 01
C 0497, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19019, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 2011); see also Lindsay
Gellman, Millenials: Love Them or Let Them Go, WALL ST. J. (May 6, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-employers-wrangle-restless-millennials-1430818203
(reporting that the median job tenure is declining).
3. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT
STATISTICS (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-court-managementstatistics-december-2014 [https://perma.cc/HV32-4HH5] (listing median time from filing to
trial for civil cases in U.S. District Courts as 26.3 months).
4. See Samuel W. Cooper, Guideposts for Handling Corporate Investigations, 41
LITIG. 30, 30 (2015); Michel Rosenfeld, The Transformation of the Attorney–Client
Privilege: In Search of an Ideological Reconciliation of Individualism, the Adversary
System, & the Corporate Client’s Sec Disclosure Obligations, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 495, 542-44
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likely to leave before an attorney speaks with him and employees that have
left are more likely to have information that is necessary for the corporate
attorney.
There are currently three different approaches that courts have
taken to the issue of corporate attorney–client privilege with former
employees. This has resulted in some courts treating former employees no
differently than any third-party witness, while some have extended
privilege to only information gathering communications, and still others
have extended protection to the same extent as current employees. This note
proposes that the inconsistency is a symptom of the tension between three
variables: corporate attorney–client doctrine, evidentiary privilege rationale,
and the corporate-entity theory. Furthermore, this note concludes that
extending privilege to former employees under the subject-matter test is the
most logically sound approach.
To this end, Part I of this note provides a brief overview of how
evidentiary privilege theory, corporate-entity theory, and the corporate
attorney–client privilege developed. Part II categorizes and describes the
three divergent approaches that courts have taken to assertions of privilege
with former employees, and Part III explains how these divergent
approaches reveal the tension between corporate-entity theory and
evidentiary doctrine. Finally, this note concludes by suggesting that the
most theoretically and doctrinally sound approach is to apply the privilege
to communication with former employees to the same extent that the
privilege is applied to communications with current employees.
I. THEORY AND DOCTRINE
A. Evidentiary Privilege Rationale
The adversarial system of adjudication has always allowed limited
exceptions to the general rule that “the public has a right to every man’s
evidence.”5 The attorney–client privilege is one of the oldest of these
exceptions, dating to the time of Queen Elizabeth I.6 At that time,
protecting the communication between a lawyer and his client was justified
as an outgrowth of the attorney’s honor-bound ethical duty to protect the

(1982); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.11 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“If
an agent knows or has reason to know a fact, notice of the fact is imputed to the principal for
purposes of determining the principal’s legal relations with third parties . . . .”).
5. See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 n.8 (1996).
6. Douglas C. Rennie, Why the Beginning Should Be the End: The Argument for
Exempting Postcomplaint Materials from Rule 26(b)(5)(A)’s Privilege Log Requirement, 85
TUL. L. REV. 109, 118 (2010).
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rights of his client.7 Under this justification, disclosure of a client’s
communication was considered a betrayal of the inherent right that a client
had to trust his attorney. While attorney–client privilege has remained a
fundamental component of the adversarial system, the justification for it has
since shifted to a more limited, instrumental rationale.
1. The Instrumental Rationale for Evidentiary Privilege
By the mid-nineteenth century, the justification given for attorney–
client privilege reflected a preference for the needs of the court over the
rights of clients. 8 According to this “instrumental” rationale, privilege is
only justified when its practical benefit outweighs the high cost of
obstructing the court’s search for the truth. Starting with the assumption
that the “average layperson is so fearful that [a] revelation will later come
back to haunt him or her . . . that he or she would not make the revelation
without the assurance of confidentiality,” the instrumental rationale treats
privilege as a necessary evil.9
Professor J. Wigmore articulated what has perhaps become the
most enduring test for the application of attorney–client privilege.10 In his
judgment, communications should be protected only where the client: (1)
seeks legal advice; (2) from a professional legal adviser; (3) for the purpose
of obtaining legal advice; and the communication is (4) made in confidence
(5) by the client.11 Because privilege is in derogation of the truth-seeking
nature of the adversarial system, Wigmore urged courts to narrowly
construe its application, stating that the benefits of evidentiary privilege
“are all indirect and speculative; its obstruction . . . plain and concrete.” 12
U.S. courts have since adopted Wigmore’s test and conservative
construction, citing him as boilerplate in any decision on evidentiary
privilege.13
7. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
8. Id. § 2291; Note, The Attorney–Client Privilege: Fixed Rules, Balancing, &
Constitutional Entitlement, 91 HARV. L. REV. 464, 465 (1977) [hereinafter Fixed Rules]; see
also Rochester City Bank v. Suydam, Sage & Co., 5 How. Pr. 254, 257 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851)
(“[C]ounsel and sometimes courts have talked about the impropriety of disclosing that which
was communicated in confidence . . . as if the betrayal of a trust, or confidence reposed, had
something to do with the matter . . . . [T]he rule in question rests upon no such foundation.”).
9. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 2.3
(2002).
10. Id.; Fixed Rules, supra note 8, at 466.
11. WIGMORE, supra note 7, §§ 2294-2329.
12. Id. § 2291.
13. See RICE, supra note 1, at § 2:3 n.13 (listing cases); see also Wolfle v. United
States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934) (stating the function of marital privilege is to preserve the
relationship); United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 373 (1980) (denying the creation of a
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2. The Humanistic Rationale for Evidentiary Privilege
In more recent years, scholars such as Professor Edward J.
Imwinkelried have advocated for an alternative, rights-based rationale to
attorney–client privilege.14 This “non-instrumental” or “privacy-based”
rationale is predicated on weighting the client’s rights over those of the
collective15 and is more closely related to the early, honor-based rationale.16
Imwinkelried calls this a humanistic rationale and argues that it is a more
compatible with the ideals of the liberal democratic theory upon which the
United States was built.17 In essence, his logical argument proceeds as
follows:
1.
Liberal democracies, such as the United States,
recognize an individual’s right to autonomy.
2.
To exercise and fully engage his autonomy, a
person must be enabled to make intelligent choices.
3.
To make intelligent choices, a person must be able
to consult with third parties.
4.
When consulting with third parties, the person
must retain the ability to make an independent choice.

legislative privilege after weighing societal cost of with functional); United States v. Arthur
Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817 (1984) (stating privilege not needed to assure
communication between client and accountant); Univ. of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S.
182, 189 (1990) (denying the creation of a peer review privilege for educational institutions
because privilege “must be strictly construed”); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50
(1980) (internal citations omitted); accord Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976);
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
14. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 9, § 2.3.
15. See Jack B. Weinstein, Recognition in the United States of the Privilege of Another
Jurisdiction, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 535, 536 (1956) (“[I]t is unseemly for a man to divulge
what another was compelled to tell him by the nature of their relationship.”); see generally
23 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
EVIDENCE, § 5422 (1980 & Supp. 2015).
16. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 9, § 2.3.
17. Id. § 5.3.3; Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical
View from Liberal Democratic Theory, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 395, 407 (2000) (“Liberal
democracy is a political system with representative governments elected by popular
majority, the rule of law enshrined to protect individuals and minorities, and a significant
sector of economic, associational, and communicative activity that is largely autonomous
from government control.”).
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5.
To make a fully independent choice, the person
must be able to trust the third-party to fully inform him.
6.
To trust the third-party, there must be privacy in
their communications.
7.
Privacy in communications is preserved in our
legal system through evidentiary privileges.
8.
Therefore, the recognition of an evidentiary
privilege between an attorney and his client is necessary to
enable autonomy. 18
This line of argument is particularly persuasive when considering
that the relationship functions in a complex legal system where guidance is
vital for the client.19 The client’s ability to make intelligent choices
necessitates knowing what those choices are and potential consequences.20
While there is still a functional aspect to privilege under a humanistic
viewpoint, the emphasis is on enabling the client rather than the court.21
3. A Middle-Ground Rationale for Privilege
A third point of view is that the humanistic and instrumental
rationales need not be mutually exclusive.22 Each approach assumes that
circumstances exist in which privilege is needed, and even under a
humanistic rationale there is a utility to the privilege in enabling the
exercise of a fundamental right.23 Additionally, if the instrumental rationale
is truly utilitarian, it should take into consideration the costs to all parties
involved, including the cost to a client’s rights. If the cost of denying the
client his right to make informed decisions is greater than the benefit to
society, then the utilitarian must conclude that privilege should be granted.
Thus, the distinction between the two rationales may be fairly characterized
as one of degree rather than kind.
18. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 9, § 5.3.3.
19. Rosenfeld, supra note 4, at 505-06.
20. See Charles Fried, The Lawyer As Friend: The Moral Foundations of the LawyerClient Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1073 (1976).
21. Id.; see also RONALD GOLDFARB, IN CONFIDENCE: WHEN TO PROTECT SECRECY
AND WHEN TO REQUIRE DISCLOSURE 64 (2009); Albert W. Alschuler, The Search for Truth
Continued, The Privilege Retained: A Response to Judge Frankel, 54 U. COLO. L. REV. 67,
73-74 (1983).
22. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 15, § 5422.
23. Note, Modes of Analysis: The Theories & Justifications of Privileged
Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1471, 1484 (1985) [hereinafter Modes of Analysis].
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Where one lands on the spectrum between the humanistic and
instrumental rationales reflects one’s underlying value judgments. For early
legal scholars such as Bentham or Wigmore, truth was static and
objective.24 Therefore, confidentiality was nothing more than an obstacle,
and privilege could only exist if necessary because an individual has no
right to obstruct justice. This theory, however, requires the assumption that
the truth is something that can always be objectively determined.
However, if there are times when “truth is in the eye of the
beholder,” elevating a duty to the system over the duty to the individual
undermines the adversarial system itself.25 When privilege is based on a
duty to the client, confidentiality ensures the client’s right to a fair
adjudication. This view is more compatible with the attorney’s role of
“pursu[ing] not the greater good, not what is best for the ‘system,’ not even
justice, but rather only the client’s cause.”26
The distinction between the two rationales may make little
difference in the archetypical attorney–client relationship, such as one when
an individual contacts an attorney. Under either rationale, the client will
receive protection over his communication with the attorney and the court
need not ask whether it is allowing privilege due to a preference for liberal
democratic or utilitarian ideals. The choice of rationales, however, has
significant normative implications when the client is a corporation.
B. Corporate-Entity Theory
Corporate-entity theory refers to the set of assumptions made
regarding the nature and purpose of the corporate form. Like the rationale
behind evidentiary privilege, corporate-entity theory is both descriptive and
proscriptive. That is, legal scholars use these concepts to explain existing
doctrine as well as to suggest how doctrine should develop. In his article
Theories of the Corporation, David Millon notes that historically there has
been a direct relationship between the theory that society has used to
describe a corporation and the legal doctrines proscribed to regulate the
corporation.27 How corporations are described, i.e. what positive theory is
used to explain the nature of a corporation, gives rise to normative
implications that can be used to evaluate legal doctrine.28 At the same time,

24. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 9, § 3.2.1.
25. Lawrence J. Vilardo & Vincent E. Doyle, III, Where Did the Zeal Go?, 38 LITIG.
53, 57 (2011).
26. Id.
27. See David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201 (1990).
28. Id. at 241.
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the normative implications of legal doctrines have influenced corporate
theory by lending support for one theory over another.29
1. Early Grant-Based Theory
Throughout history, regulation of the corporate entity has shifted
between the public and private spheres of law.30 When the rules controlling
a corporation emanate from the private agreement of those who formed it,
the corporation is controlled by private law. When the rules controlling a
corporation emanate from a sovereign government or monarch, the
corporation is controlled by public law. The first corporate forms were
conceived of as an extension of a nation’s sovereign power, governed by
public law. In medieval England, early corporate forms were authorized to
exist via a grant from the monarchy for very specific purposes, such as
developing global trade.31 These entities were considered quasi-public,
formed for the public good with grants of exclusive power coming directly
from the government.32
At the start of the eighteenth century, leaders in the United States
were skeptical of chartered corporations due to their experiences in Europe,
where corporations were considered a tool of the oligarchy. Thus, a concern
over the balance of power and freedom of trade created resistance to
allowing free incorporation.33 Consequently, the privilege to incorporate
was available only through a legislative grant and corporations were
restricted to the specific activities granted.34
Ironically, this tightly controlled access to the corporate form
resulted in an aggrandizement of power into the hands of those who had
access to the legislature. 35 In response, states passed “free incorporation”
29. Id. at 241-42.
30. See W. S. Holdsworth, English Corporation Law in the 16th and 17th Centuries,
31 YALE L.J. 382, 394-96 (1922).
31. Id.
32. See Samuel Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, 2
HARV. L. REV. 105, 111 (1888); see also 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 1999)
(“They were, rather, looked upon as public agencies, to which had been entrusted the duty
of regulating foreign trade, just as the domestic trades were subjected to the government of
the guilds.”) (citation omitted).
33. Note, Incorporating the Republic: The Corporation in Antebellum Political
Culture, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1883, 1891 (1989) [hereinafter Incorporating the Republic]; see
Head & Amory v. Providence Ins. Co., 6 U.S. 127, 169 (1804) (stating that the rights of
corporations are derived from their enabling acts).
34. See Susanna M. Kim, Characteristics of Soulless Persons: The Applicability of the
Character Evidence Rule to Corporations, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 763, 785 (2000).
35. Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory,
88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 181 (1985).
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laws to separate the corporate form from legislative function.36 This
doctrinal shift gave rise to a new question: free of its government charter,
was the corporation an entity separate and apart from its creators, or was it
an aggregate of the individuals who formed it?37
Two competing theories formed along these two possibilities. The
“aggregate” or “nexus-of-contracts” theory conceptualized the corporation
as an aggregate organization of private individuals who had mutually
agreed to engage in the pursuit of profit.38 The “natural entity” theory
posited that the corporation, which had always been distinct and separate
from its individual constituents, had evolved into a real entity under the law
with rights and responsibilities concomitant with that of a natural person.39
2. Natural-Entity Theory
As corporations grew larger and their ownership became more
fragmented, the natural-entity theory appeared to most accurately describe
the distinct and separate nature of the corporation from the individuals who
held shares.40 Without a mandate to serve the public good, which had
traditionally accompanied a government charter, the question arose as to
how corporations would be held accountable for their actions.41 The theory
of the corporation as a natural entity answered this question by imbuing the
corporation with “obligations or responsibilities [no] different from those
owed by natural persons.”42 This concept of “corporate citizenship” placed
an affirmative duty on corporate management to consider more than just
profit.43
3. Aggregate-Entity Theory
Under the competing “aggregate” theory, the corporate entity is
considered a logical outgrowth of partnership and property law principles.44
36. Id.
37. Id. at 182.
38. Susanna Kim Ripken, Corporations Are People Too: A Multi-Dimensional
Approach to the Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97, 109-10
(2009).
39. Id. at 112-13
40. Millon, supra note 27, at 216.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 217, 220 (citing E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers
Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932).
44. A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV.
L. REV. 1365, 1367 (1932); see also A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 275 (1932).
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Under this theory, corporate management is a trustee of shareholder
property and any consideration of interests other than maximizing
shareholder wealth is inherently incompatible with the nature of the
corporation.45 Social responsibility is achieved by the corporation pursuing
what it is most capable of doing: generating wealth. 46
However, one consequence of restricting corporate actions to those
that build shareholder wealth is that corporations have “a rational incentive
to try to externalize the costs of their conduct to society . . . while
internalizing the resulting excess profits reaped from those shortcuts.”47 As
a result, public law is necessary to provide the checks and balances needed
to
protect
those
affected
by
the
externalities
created.48
4. Experience Influencing Doctrine
The serious effect of externalities became evident after a wave of
corporate takeovers in the mid-twentieth century. It was clear that profitmaximizing decisions sometimes came at a great cost to employees and
other constituents.49 Hostile takeovers were often financially profitable for
the shareholders, and therefore conceptually difficult to fight under an
aggregate-entity theory. The takeovers resulted in the parceling up of
companies, the loss of jobs, and the deterioration of geographic economic
centers.50 In response, state legislatures began passing constituency statutes.
These laws were expressly designed to give corporate management the
legal authority to consider interests beyond shareholder wealthmaximization without fear that they would be sued by the shareholders.51
Thus, while aggregate-entity theory arguably dominated economic and
corporate legal scholarship throughout the twentieth century, the doctrinal
reality was an increasing emphasis on corporate autonomy.52 The recent
45. Millon, supra note 27, at 221.
46. See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its
Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, at 33 (“[T]here is one and only one social responsibility
of business—to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so
long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free
competition without deception or fraud.”).
47. Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collison Course?: The Tension
Between Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV.
335, 339 (2015).
48. Id. at 357.
49. Millon, supra note 27, at 232.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David K. Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby,
70 BUS. LAW. 1, 13-14 (2015).
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United States Supreme Court decisions Burwell v. Hobby Lobby and
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission provided a confirmation of
this evolution. In both of these decisions, the Court built its analysis on the
assumption that the corporation is a rights-bearing entity.
5. The Corporation as a Rights-Bearing Entity in Hobby Lobby and Citizens
United
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the Supreme
Court built its reasoning on the assumption that the corporation is an entity
with rights and responsibilities independent of its constituents. In that case,
the Court held that a corporation may financially support political
candidates out of corporate funds.53 The decision has fueled the
characterization of the corporation as a natural entity in legal doctrine. In
his analysis of the decision, Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Leo
Strine predicted the normative implications on legal doctrine:
[I]f corporations are regarded as having equal rights with
human beings . . . their managers must have the legal right
to act with conscience and a regard for the full range of
concerns that animate flesh-and-blood citizens of the
United States.54
Justice Strine further speculates that the combination of free
political spending and profit maximization will logically lead to a
weakening of government regulation.55 Without public law controlling the
corporation’s externalities, society must necessarily turn to the
corporation’s own moral obligation to control externalities,56 which creates
a need for management to make decisions autonomously from shareholders.
In a similar endorsement of the rights-bearing nature of
corporations, the Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby held
that corporations are persons capable of exercising religion under the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).57 Professors Lyman
Johnson and David Millon noted that the Court’s recognition of
corporations as persons under RFRA grew out of two implicit assumptions.
First, the Court accepted the assumption that, under state law, corporations
are persons distinct and apart from any natural person.58 Second, the Court
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Strine, supra note 47, at 360-61.
Id.
Id. at 390.
Id.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775 (2014).
Id.
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accepted the assumption that a corporation can have rights that exist
separately and distinct from its constituents. Thus, without much analysis of
the issue, the Supreme Court treated corporations as distinct rights-bearing
entities.59
6. Experience Informing Theory
In hindsight, it is easy to see that the aggregate theory appeared to
be an accurate description of the corporation because it was confirmed by
experience of property and partnership law. When corporations became
private entities apart from government charters, the corporation was a
hybrid partnership and property. As society’s experience with corporations
progressed, the concept of the corporation as an aggregate of individuals
failed to fully encapsulate experience. As Professor Susanna Kim has
pointed out:
We regularly observe and interact with corporations as
entities. We read newspaper accounts of corporate mergers
and acquisitions, follow lawsuits alleging corporate
manufacturing of defective products, acknowledge
corporate gifts to charities and good causes, and remit our
monthly payments to utility companies. Our own
experience tells us that corporations are not merely
fictional creatures. To insist that they are denies the
empirical reality of their existence.60
Legal doctrine has since responded by treating the corporate form
increasingly like a rights bearing entity.
Other areas of law have also treated corporations as distinct entities
apart from their constituents.61 Particularly relevant to the issue of privilege,
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.13 states, “[a] lawyer
employed or retained by an organization represents the organization and not
its directors, officers, or other constituents.”62 Although the aggregate,
wealth-maximization theory continues to be considered “the dominant
framework of analysis for corporate law and corporate governance

59. Id.
60. Kim, supra note 34, at 786.
61. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96 cmt. b (AM LAW INST.
2000) (“The so-called ‘entity’ theory of organizational representation . . . is now universally
recognized in American law, for purposes of determining the identity of the direct
beneficiary of legal representation of corporations and other forms of organizations.”).
62. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.13 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014).
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today . . . ,” it is so “despite the absence of legal authority.”63 Modern legal
doctrine and popular experience strongly suggests that, doctrinally and
conceptually, “the more sound approach is to view the corporation as a real
person with separate and independent rights and obligations.”64
C. The Development of Attorney–Client Privilege for Corporations
For over 100 years, federal courts, without much analysis, held that
attorney–client privilege was available for corporate clients.65 In United
States v. Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co., one of the earliest decisions
to consider the issue, the U.S. Supreme Court allowed the privilege to apply
to a corporation, stating that “the desirability of protecting confidential
communications between attorney and client as a matter of public policy is
too well known and has been too often recognized by text-books and courts
to need extended comment now.”66
The issue did not receive full treatment until 1962, when the
Northern Illinois District Court held that attorney–client privilege did not
apply to corporations at all.67 In Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas
Association, Chief Judge William Campbell stated that “a corporation’s
right to assert the privilege has somewhat generally been taken for granted
by the judiciary, myself included, without a proper reliance on stare decisis
or the promulgation anywhere of record of a clear legal analysis of the issue
involved.”68 Equating privilege to the Fifth Amendment right, Judge
Campbell reasoned that the attorney–client privilege is “personal in
nature”69 and that “a corporation which is a mere creature of the state and
not a natural entity should not, without legislation, be afforded a privilege
historically created only for natural persons.”70
Judge Campbell ventured further to say that even if the privilege
applied, determining who represents the corporation for purposes of
asserting the privilege would be prohibitively difficult.71 He speculated that

63. Johnson & Millon, supra note 52, at 14-15 (quoting Michael Klausner, Fact and
Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1326 (2013)).
64. Kim, supra note 34, at 786-87.
65. Vincent C. Alexander, The Corporate Attorney–Client Privilege: A Study of the
Participants, 63 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 191, 220 (1989).
66. United States v. Louisville and Nashville R.R. Co., 236 U.S. 318, 336
67. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Am. Gas Ass’n, 207 F. Supp. 771, 772 (N.D. Ill. 1962)
[hereinafter Radiant Burners I].
68. Id. at 772.
69. Id. at 773.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 774-75.
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the shareholder would be the most likely candidate because it is “only for
their benefit that a corporation could make claim to the privilege.”72
Judge Campbell’s reasoning reveals two interesting points. First, he
rejects privilege for the corporation by characterizing it as personal and
equating it to the constitutional right against self-incrimination. His choice
of words sound like he is justifying privilege with a humanistic, rightsbased rationale—despite the fact that Wigmore’s instrumental rationale had,
by 1962, solidly established itself as a part of the American jurisprudential
lexicon. Second, the fact that he concluded such a “personal” privilege was
categorically incompatible with a corporation suggests that he considered
the corporation as something other than a rights-bearing entity. This is
further supported in his conjecture that the shareholder was the most likely
candidate to receive the privilege, because the corporation exists “only for
their benefit.”
Judge Campbell’s basic value judgments logically lead to this
holding. The application of a humanistic evidentiary privilege rationale to
an aggregate entity results in the conclusion that the corporation should not
be afforded a privilege over communications because the corporation is a
nexus of individuals and as a legal construction has no rights. Furthermore,
should the privilege be applied, it would logically only apply to the
shareholder, because it is he for whom the corporation exists. Thus, in the
first opinion to analyze the application of attorney–client privilege to a
corporate client, Judge Campbell’s fundamental views on privilege and
corporate entity had a normative impact on his pronouncement of positive
law.
Yet, the case did not end there. After allowing for additional
briefing on the matter, Judge Campbell revisited the issue in a second order.
He admits that but-for the problem of applying a personal privilege to the
corporate form, he would personally have preferred to entitle corporations
to the attorney–client privilege, due to “the large and complex nature of
business transactions.” 73 Nevertheless, he appears to be constrained to hold
that evidentiary privilege simply cannot apply to a corporation.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the decision.74 The court
echoed the reasoning of Louisville and Nashville Railroad, pointing out that
privilege had been available to corporations for more than a century and
there was no precedent for its rejection.75 The court reasoned that the

72. Id.
73. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Am. Gas Ass’n, 209 F. Supp. 321, 325 (N.D. Ill. 1962)
[hereinafter Radiant Burners II].
74. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Am. Gas Ass’n, 320 F.2d 314, 324 (7th Cir. 1963)
[hereinafter Radiant Burners III].
75. Id.
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generally accepted nature of the issue required an accommodation in the
rules of the privilege to conform with modern business practices.76
Unlike the district court, the Seventh Circuit interpreted privilege as
a public policy consideration rather than a personal right. Shifting the
rationale to a clearly utilitarian, instrumental view, the court stated that the
purpose of privilege is “encouraging full disclosure by the client.”77 The
court disagreed with Judge Campbell that the difficulty in application of
privilege to a corporate client was dispositive, but did not address whether
privilege is dependent on the real or impersonal nature of the corporation.78
The court concluded that “a corporation is entitled to the same treatment as
any other ‘client’—no more and no less.”79
The Radiant Burners decision left the conceptual basis for
corporate attorney–client privilege not much clearer than it was before. The
court stated that the purpose was instrumental and accepted as established
the availability of privilege to the corporate entity, without addressing the
nature of the corporation. While not expressly adopting Judge Campbell’s
shareholder-dominant view of the corporation, the court apparently saw no
need to challenge it either. Rather, it stated that a difficulty in determining
who the client is for purposes of applying privilege was not determinative.
The key question that was not answered was how privilege could
incentivize a corporation to communicate with its attorney, as the
instrumental rationale assumes it does. As it happened, the Eastern District
Court of Pennsylvania had confronted this logical disjunction head-on
while the first Radiant Burner decision was pending appeal.
1. The Control-Group Test
In City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., the Eastern
District Court of Pennsylvania also concluded that attorney–client privilege
extended to corporations but applied several important qualifications that
largely resolved what Judge Campbell had forecasted would be an
insurmountable difficulty. The court did so by articulating the “control
group” test.80 Under this test, communications are privileged when they are
76. Id. at 323.
77. Id. (quoting Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85 (D. Del.
1962).
78. Id. at 322-23. But see id. at 324 (Kiley, J., concurring) (“The corporation does not
itself have attributes which give rise to the need of intimate advice. . . . It does, however,
have an economic nature because of which it needs legal advice in the same way that the
early individual needed, and his contemporary counterpart needs, that advice.”).
79. Id.
80. City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Pa.
1962).
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made by an individual who is “in a position to control or even to take a
substantial part in a decision about any action which the corporation may
take upon the advice of the attorney.”81 The reasoning is that when an
employee is in this position of control, the agent “is (or personifies) the
corporation when he makes his disclosure to the lawyer.”82
This test provides a more logically coherent connection between
the instrumental rationale and the aggregate-entity theory. If privilege exists
only to the extent that it encourages the client to fully communicate, the
only individuals with an interest close enough to that of the corporation to
be influenced by the existence of privilege are the ones in control. Perhaps
reflecting the dominance of the aggregate-entity theory at the time, most
federal courts used the control-group test until the 1981 Supreme Court
decision Upjohn Co. v. United States.83 The Upjohn decision adopted the
subject-matter test, which had originated in the Seventh Circuit, the same
circuit that had reversed Judge Campbell some years earlier.
2. The Subject-Matter Test
Nearly a decade after the control-group test was used in
Westinghouse Electric, the Seventh Circuit expanded on its earlier
reasoning from Radiant Burners II and established an alternative to the
control-group test.84 Using the “subject-matter test,” the court held that an
employee’s communications are sufficiently identified with the corporation
when “(1) the employee makes the communication at the direction of his
superiors in the corporation” and (2) the subject of the communication is
“the performance by the employee of the duties of his employment.”85 The
Eighth Circuit also adopted that test in Diversified Industries, Inc. v.
Meredith, reasoning that the subject-matter test is more appropriate for
corporate entities because it shifts the focus away from whom the attorney
is communicating with to why the attorney is communicating with that
person,86 thus resolving the problem of determining who adequately
represents the corporation.
The subject-matter test may resolve the issue of who represents the
corporation for purposes of privilege by changing the direction of the
inquiry, but it does not resolve the incongruity of the instrumental rationale
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. John E. Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Consideration of the Corporate Attorney–Client
Privilege, 57 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 443, 451 (1982); WRIGHT AND GRAHAM, supra note 15, § 5483,
at 289.
84. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1970).
85. Id.
86. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1977).
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and the nature of the corporation. Rather, the reduced emphasis on who is
speaking under the subject-matter test further estranges the relationship
between providing privilege and creating an incentive to communicate.
i. Upjohn Company v. United States
In Upjohn Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court expressly
declined to establish a broad rule87 but cited the Diversified Industries test
with approval88 and rejected the control-group test altogether.89 In its
analysis, the court did not linger on the nature of a corporation, stating only
that it is “an artificial creature of the law.”90 As for the difficulty of applying
privilege to a corporate entity, the Court stated it “has assumed that the
privilege applies when the client is a corporation, and the Government does
not contest the general proposition.”91
To explain its departure from the control-group test, the Court
started with the basic proposition that the purpose of privilege is “to
encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients
and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and
administration of justice.”92 The Court went further by reasoning that the
“privilege exists to protect not only the giving of professional advice to
those who can act on it but also the giving of information to the lawyer to
enable him to give sound and informed advice.”93
The decision in Upjohn rests on three basic assumptions: (1) the
attorney–client privilege exists for corporations; (2) the privilege is justified
under a utilitarian theory; and (3) the corporation is an artificial entity.
While these three assumptions are the same ones that the court in
Diversified Industries began with, the Court in Upjohn allows for a wider
scope by enlarging privilege to include consideration of the lawyer’s need
for information, separate and apart from the client’s need for advice.
After Upjohn, communications between an attorney and his client’s
employees are privileged if (1) the communications are made by an
employee acting as such; (2) the communications were made at the
direction of corporate superiors for the purpose of securing legal advice
87. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 386 (1981).
88. Id. at 391-92.
89. Id. at 394-95. Disagreement exists as to the intended effect of the Court’s holding.
See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 15, § 5483; Sexton, supra note 83, at 458-59 (pointing
out that “the Justices rejected the control group test without embracing the subject matter
test”).
90. Upjohn, 449 at 389-90.
91. Id. at 390.
92. Id. at 389.
93. Id. at 390.
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from counsel; (3) the communications concerned matters within the scope
of the employee’s corporate duties; and (4) the employee was sufficiently
aware that he or she was being questioned in order for the corporation to
obtain legal advice from counsel.94
3. The Recognized Incongruity Between the Subject-Matter Test and the
Instrumental-Privilege Theory
In both Diversified Industries and Westinghouse Electric,
Wigmore’s instrumental rationale was cited as the “purpose” behind
evidentiary privilege.95 However, in what may be a late vindication of
Judge Campbell’s struggle in Radiant Burners, commentators have
subsequently noted that a strict instrumental rationale is inherently
incompatible with the subject-matter test.96 A strict instrumental rationale
would require the corporation to show that “but for” the evidentiary
privilege it would not communicate openly with its attorney.97 Yet, the
corporation cannot speak on its own but requires others to speak for it, so
the incentivizing aspect of the instrumental theory would appear
inapplicable to the corporation-as-client theory.98 Therefore, assuming the
instrumental rationale, the control-group test would make more sense for
determining who is included in corporate attorney–client privilege because
it is those who control the corporation that are more likely to be influenced
the existence of privilege.99
II. CURRENT APPROACHES TO PRIVILEGE WITH FORMER EMPLOYEES
While the facts in Upjohn included communications between
former employees and corporate counsel, the Court expressly declined to
address whether former employees were included within the test, because

94. Id. at 394-95. Some states have retained the control-group test. In these states,
privilege for communications with former employees is unlikely to apply because a former
employee never satisfies the control group requirement that he or she be in a position to
direct corporate action in response to legal advice. Becker, supra note 2, at 889-90; see, e.g.,
Barrett Indus. Trucks, Inc. v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 129 F.R.D. 515 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (no
privilege for former employees under Illinois law because they are not a part of the “control
group”). Thus, these two subjects are beyond the scope of this note.
95. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1977); City of
Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 484 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
96. See, e.g., 24 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 15, § 5476; IMWINKELRIED, supra
note 9, § 6.9.1.
97. WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 2291, at 552.
98. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct 1.13 cmt. 1 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2014).
99. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 9, § 6.9.1 (citing Alexander, supra note 65, at 415).
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the issue had not been raised below.100 In a concurring opinion, however,
Justice Burger stated, “[I]n my view the Court should make clear now, that
as a general rule, a communication is privileged at least when, as here, an
employee or former employee speaks at the direction of the management
with an attorney regarding conduct or proposed conduct within the scope of
employment.”101 As the cases that follow demonstrate, the lack of a
conceptual reckoning between corporate theory, privilege rationale, and the
now-established attorney–client corporate privilege doctrine begins to
become apparent as evidentiary challenges to communications with former
employees stretched the doctrine to its logical limits.
Among jurisdictions that have adopted the subject-matter test, three
general approaches have arisen to address the issue of privilege for
communications with a client’s former employees. The first approach is to
treat them no differently than any other third-party witness.102 The second
approach construes privilege narrowly but recognizes a legitimate need for
privilege when investigative, or information gathering, in nature.103 The
third approach views former employees no differently than current
employees and treats communications with former employees the same as
communications with current employees under the Upjohn test.104
As an initial matter, there does not appear to be any disagreement
that communications between an attorney and a client’s employee stay
privileged even after they leave the company.105 In other words,
communication does not become unprivileged when an employee leaves.
A. Approach One: No different than any other third-party witness
Courts that have categorically denied evidentiary privilege over
communications with former employees have generally done so on the
basis that a former employee no longer acts as an agent or representative of
100. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394 n.3 (1981).
101. Id. at 402-03 (J. Burger, concurring) (emphasis added); see also Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 1970) (rejecting control-group test in
fact pattern that included former employees but not making any distinction in its between
current and former employees).
102. See, e.g., Clark Equipment Co. v. Lift Parts Mfg. Co., No. 82 C 4585, 1985 WL
2917, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 1, 1985).
103. See, e.g., Peralta, 190 F.R.D. at 41.
104. See, e.g., In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust
Litig., 658 F.2d 1355, 1361 n.7 (9th Cir. 1981).
105. EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY–CLIENT PRIVILEGE 119 (5th ed. 2007)
(“Whatever communications were privileged communications during the course of the
former employee’s employment should clearly remain privileged. No reason exists to
terminate the privilege along with the termination of the employment.”); see also Peralta,
190 F.R.D. at 38, 41; Infosystems, Inc. v. Ceridian Corp., 197 F.R.D. 303, 306 (E.D. Mich.
2000).
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the client corporation.106 In Clark Equipment Co. v. Lift Parts
Manufacturing Co., the plaintiff claimed attorney–client privilege for
communications between its attorney and a former employee.107 The
Northern District Court of Illinois held that the privilege did not apply to
former employees because “[f]ormer employees are not the client. They
share no identity of interests in the outcome of the litigation. Their
willingness to provide information is unrelated to the directions of their
former corporate superiors, and they have no duty to their former employer
to provide such information.”108 The court concluded by saying that “it is
virtually impossible to distinguish the position of a former employee from
any other third-party witness who might have pertinent information about
one or more corporate parties to a lawsuit.”109
In another decision that rested on the lack of an agency
relationship, the Northern District of California denied privilege over
information-gathering emails between a bank’s former CEO and the
attorney for the bank’s trustee during bankruptcy proceedings in
Schoenmann v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.110 The attorney for the
Trustee argued that he “was obtaining relevant information from [the
former CEO] as a former officer to advise and represent the Trustee.”111 The
court nonetheless denied privilege over the emails, stating, “[The former
employee] was not communicating with the Trustee and [the Trustee’s]
counsel to obtain legal advice and was not a client of the Trustee’s
counsel.”112
Finally, the technical inability of a former employee to fit within
the precise wording of Upjohn has prevented some courts from extending
attorney–client privilege. In Infosystems, Inc. v. Ceridian Corp., the District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied the extension of privilege
to a former employee because it interpreted Upjohn as setting a strict
106. See EPSTEIN, supra note 105, at 168 (stating opinion that privilege should not
apply because “the former employee is . . . no longer an agent for the corporation and
occupies a position no different than that of any stranger.”).
107. Clark, 1985 WL 2917, at *5.
108. Id.
109. Id. Contra Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491 (role of
employee during employment is not equivalent to that of a bystander witness); Diversified
Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1977).
110. Schoenmann v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 7 F. Supp.3d 1009, 1015 (2014).
111. Id.
112. Id.; see also Allen, Adams & Co. v. Harrison, 30 Vt. 219, 221 (1858) (no privilege
because former employee not a party to the suit); Connolly Data Sys., Inc. v. Victor Tech.,
Inc., 114 F.R.D. 89, 94 (S.D. Cal. 1987) (no attorney–client privilege for former employee
under California law because no longer representative of the company); Nakajima v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 857 F. Supp. 100, 105 (D.D.C. 1994) (finding no privilege for former
employee under D.C. law because former employee not seeking legal advice).
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requirement that communications be made “at the direction of corporate
superiors.”113 Thus, once again, the court appears to deny privilege on the
lack of an agency relationship. Reaching a similar conclusion as the Clark
Equipment decision, the court stated that “[c]ounsel’s communications with
a former employee of the client corporation generally should be treated no
differently from communications with any other third-party fact witness.”114
The Infosystems court did, however, qualify its denial by leaving
open the possibility that the moving party could show that the
communicating ex-employee had a “present connection or agency
relationship with the client corporation,” or that the communication
“concerns a confidential matter that was uniquely within the knowledge of
the former employee.”115 Because the defendant had not shown any special
circumstances or even submitted the materials at issue for an in camera
review, the court denied the motion for a protective order.116
B. Approach Two: A qualified privilege for investigative
communications
The second approach recognizes a corporation’s need for
information but distinguishes former employees on the basis that they lack
a duty to the employer. Under this approach, courts have extended privilege
over the attorney’s information-gathering communications but not over predeposition counseling. In Peralta v. Cendant Corp., the District Court for
the District of Connecticut considered a pre-deposition communication
between the defendant’s attorney and former employee.117 Following the
lead of Clark Equipment, the court stated categorically that Upjohn could
not be applied wholesale to former employees because the former employee
has no duty to provide the information sought.118
The court in Peralta did leave open the possibility that investigative
communications may be covered under certain circumstances, “if the nature
and purpose . . . was to learn facts related to [the case] that [the former
employee] was aware of as a result of her employment.”119 The test, the
court said, should be “Did the communication relate to the former
employee’s conduct and knowledge, or communication with defendant’s

113. Infosystems, 197 F.R.D. at 305 (citing Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394).
114. Id. at 306.
115. Id.
116. Id.; See also Shew v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n, 714 A.2d 664, 670 (Conn. 1998)
(holding no privilege unless special circumstances shown under Connecticut law).
117. Peralta v. Cendant Corp., 190 F.R.D. 38, 39 (D. Conn. 1999).
118. Id.
119. Id.
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counsel, during his or her employment?”120 Several federal district courts
have since adopted the Peralta test.121
C. Approach Three: Privilege allowed under subject-matter test
Under the third approach, courts view former employees no
differently than current employees. These courts extend privilege to
communications with former employees to the same extent as current
employees under the subject-matter test. Both the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals follow this approach.122
In In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Products
Antitrust Litigation, the District Court for the Central District of California
issued an order holding a corporate attorney’s pre-deposition “orientation
sessions” unprotected by attorney–client privilege. The district court had
reasoned that the opposing party must be able to “make full inquiry into the
influences that may have affected the testimony.”123 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the communications were protected
under Upjohn:
Former employees, as well as current employees, may
possess the relevant information needed by corporate
counsel to advise the client with respect to actual or
120. Id.
121. See Gioe v. AT&T Inc., No. CV 09-4545 (LDW)(AKT), 2010 WL 3780701, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2010); Exp.-Imp. Bank of the U.S. v. Asia Pulp & Paper Co., 232
F.R.D. 103, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Surles v. Air France, No. 00CIV5004RMBFM, 2001 WL
815522, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2001) aff’d, No. 00 Civ. 5004(RMBFM), 2001 WL
1142231 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2001); Nicholls v. Philips Semiconductor Mfg.,
No. 07 Civ.6789 (KMK)(GAY), 2009 WL 2277869, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2009)
(denying protective order); City of New York v. Coastal Oil N.Y., Inc., No. 96 Civ. 8667
(RPP), 2000 WL 145748, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2000); Wade Williams Distribution, Inc. v.
Am. Broad. Companies, Inc., No. 00 CIV. 5002 (LMM), 2004 WL 1487702, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2004); United States ex rel. Hunt v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, LLC,
340 F. Supp. 2d 554, 557-58 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
122. See In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582 (4th Cir. 1997); In re Coordinated Pretrial
Proceedings in Petroleum Prod. Antitrust Litig., 658 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1981). Several
lower courts have followed this lead. See, e.g., Admiral Ins. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist.
of Arizona, 881 F.2d 1486, 1493 (9th Cir. 1989) (for investigative purposes); Goswami v.
DePaul Univ., No. 12 C 7167, 2014 WL 1307585, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2014); Cool v.
BorgWarner Diversified Transmission Prod., Inc., No. IP 02-960-C(B/S), 2003 WL
23009017, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 29, 2003) (citing “need to know” logic); Al-Turki v. Fenn,
No. 89 CIV.6217 LMM THK, 1995 WL 231278, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 1995); United
States v. King, 536 F. Supp. 253, 260 (C.D. Cal. 1982) disapproved on other grounds,
United States v. Zolin, 842 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Worldwide Wholesale Lumber,
Inc., 392 B.R. 197, 203 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2008).
123. Id. at 1359.
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potential difficulties. . . . The orientation sessions
undoubtedly provided information which will be used by
corporate counsel in advising the companies how to handle
the pending lawsuits.”124
The court also noted that Upjohn forbade discovery of what was
said in the sessions regardless of whether the attorneys were acting as
counsel for the employees at the deposition.125
In In re Allen, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals also extended
privilege under the Upjohn subject-matter test to investigative
communications with a former employee.126 The court cited the
instrumental rationale for the attorney–client privilege, stating that
attorneys “need . . . to know all that relates to the client’s reasons for
seeking representation if the professional mission is to be carried out.”127
Using this reasoning, the court held that the Upjohn analysis applied
equally to former employees.128
III. THE TENSION BETWEEN EVIDENTIARY THEORY, CORPORATE
THEORY, AND CORPORATE ATTORNEY–CLIENT PRIVILEGE DOCTRINE
So what is the proper scope of corporate attorney–client privilege
for former employees? The answer depends on how we justify privilege and
characterize corporations. If we accept that the instrumental rationale
justifies privilege and that corporations are real entities, privilege arguably
should not apply to corporations at all or, at most, the control-group test
should be used. Under the control-group test, privilege for communications
with former employees will never be privileged.
If we accept the instrumental rationale to justify privilege and the
aggregate-entity theory for corporations, we reach a similar result. As Judge
Campbell held, the difficulty of determining who within an aggregate of
individuals is capable of holding privilege for the corporation may prove
prohibitively difficult. As a compromise, we can allow those in a position
capable of acting on legal advice to hold privilege as the closest proxy for

124. Petroleum Prod., 658 F.2d at 1361 n.7.
125. Id. at 1361.
126. In re Allen, 106 F.3d at 606.
127. Id. (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)).
128. See also Denver Post Corp. v. Univ. of Colorado, 739 P.2d 874, 880 (Colo. App.
1987) (holding Upjohn rationale covers communications with former employees under
Colorado state law); Melchior v. Hilite Int’l, Inc., No. 13-50177, 2013 WL 2238754, at *2
(E.D. Mich. May 21, 2013) (“That [witness] is former rather than current employee makes
no difference.”).
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the group. In this scenario, the control-group test once again makes more
sense and former employees will be precluded.
Both of these scenarios suggest that current corporate attorney–
client doctrine is simply incompatible with the instrumental rationale. One
option, therefore, is to reverse Upjohn. This would be a triumph of theory
over experience. If theory is the basis on which doctrine is built and
doctrine accurately fits our experience, then logically we must question
what our theory has become.
A. Experience Informing Theory: Reverse Engineering Upjohn
In A Post-Upjohn Consideration of the Corporate Attorney–Client
Privilege, John Sexton points out that the Upjohn Court employed a
“functional mode of analysis.”129 The decision “focuses primarily on the
perceived purposes of the privilege.”130 If theory is the basis upon which
doctrine is built, Upjohn started from the top down. The Court stated that
the purpose of privilege is “to encourage full and frank communications
between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public
interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.”131
According to Sexton, this function is ultimately about enhancing the flow of
information.132
At first blush, this sounds very much like the instrumental theory,
in that privilege is being used to encourage communication. However, a
strict application of the instrumental rationale requires that privilege be the
but-for cause for communication. As recognized earlier, the instrumental
rationale is largely inapplicable in the context of a corporation because nonparty employees do not need an incentive to obey their superior’s request
for information. In Upjohn, privilege is seen as a necessity but not because
the information wouldn’t otherwise be given by the speaker. Rather, it is a
necessity because the information might not otherwise be sought by the
corporation.
The Court in Upjohn put great weight on an attorney’s “need to
know” the information that lower-level employees had.133 Starting with the
statement that “it will frequently be employees beyond the control
group . . . who will possess the information needed by the corporation’s
lawyers,”134 the Court effectively carved out an “enclave of privacy” in
which that information could be transferred. By doing so, the Court was
129. Sexton, supra note 83, at 473.
130. Id. at 459.
131. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
132. Sexton, supra note 83, at 462.
133. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
134. Id. at 391.
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focused on the flow of information, without consideration of whether the
evidentiary rationale would actually constitute but-for causation on the
employee’s decision to speak. Thus, the Court cites Wigmore’s traditional
rationale as the basis for evidentiary privileges, while granting privilege to
encourage the client’s obtaining information rather than giving information.
One possible reason for this is that the Court was enabling the real entity of
the corporation to effectively access its “corporate knowledge.” To draw an
anthropomorphic analogy, the corporate head needs to know what the hand
is doing, or has done, to make fully informed decisions. Implicit and
necessary in the application of privilege to current employees is an
assumption that the corporation has some right to the information in the
first place.
This shift moves away from the communicator as holder of the
privilege and towards a paradigm in which the information is treated as
corporate property.135 This is a logical extension of the long recognized
doctrine that confidential business information is protectable property.136
Although the individual and the corporate entity are not physically the
same, the law has created legal fictions to bridge the gap.137 In the context
of an attorney–client privilege for individuals, making a distinction between
the holder of information and the owner of information is unnecessary.
When those roles are split, however, the instrumental rationale no longer
functions.
The other function that Sexton extrapolated from the Upjohn was
that the Court saw privilege as increasing corporate compliance with the
law.138 As Sexton notes, this assumption relies on the concept of voluntary
compliance as opposed to external regulation and implies a confidence that
corporations will adequately self-regulate.139 Self-regulation, or voluntary
internalization of externalities, in turn invokes a private law, entity-based
conception of the corporation. This again suggests that the Upjohn opinion
135. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.11 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“An agent
has a duty to use reasonable effort to provide the principal with facts that the agent knows,
has reason to know, or should know when (1) . . . the agent knows or has reason to know that
the principal would wish to have the facts or the facts are material to the agent’s duties to the
principal . . . .”); Id. § 8.11 cmt. c (stating that a former agent may continue to have a duty to
furnish information to the former principal, “[f]or example, if an agent arranges a transaction
on behalf of a principal that is ongoing at the time their agency relationship ends, it may be
foreseeable to the agent that the former principal will continue to rely on the agent to provide
information relevant to the ongoing transaction.”).
136. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26 (1987).
137. See, e.g., Trau-Med of Am., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 71 S.W.3d 691, 704 (Tenn.
2002).
138. Sexton, supra note 83, at 468.
139. Id. at 470-71 (“In essence, the Court told the IRS that a voluntary compliance
strategy was better for the IRS than the IRS thought it was.”).
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rests on an assumption that a corporation is an entity that can take into
account constituents other than its shareholders: a natural-entity theory.
After deconstructing Upjohn, we find support for the real-entity
theory of the corporation and a rights-based justification for privilege.
Accepting both of these theories, the subject-matter test is conceptually
complete. Privilege is extended to enable the entity to exercise its right to
obtain full legal advice. Under this paradigm, communications with former
employees should be protected to the same extent as communications with
current employees.
A fourth possible paradigm exists that is worth noting. We could
accept, as was implicitly done in Upjohn, that a rights-based rationale more
accurately describes experience, and accept the aggregate-entity theory of
the corporation. This appears to be the source of Wright’s criticism that the
corporation cannot obtain a rights-based privilege because corporations “are
not ‘persons’ in the same, full sense as individuals with moral views.”140
However, as previously discussed, experience tells us that corporations
already are treated as “moral” entities and have been viewed as rights
holders in many other contexts.141
B. Scope of Application to Former Employees
Assuming that privilege should extend to former employees, the
question logically arises as to what the scope should be. Peralta and its
progeny allowed for the possibility of privilege but only when the
communications were information-gathering in nature. Is this cautious
approach better?
While a narrow construction of privilege rules has been generally
accepted since the time of Bentham and Wigmore,142 Sexton concludes that
Upjohn “commands that a broader, overprotective rule be chosen when it is
difficult or impossible to determine whether the risks flowing from
overprotection are greater or less than the risks flowing from
underprotection.”143 He bases this conclusion on two principles. First, he
notes that the principle of maximizing benefits and minimizing costs would
favor flexible rules that conform to the facts of each circumstance.144
140. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 9, § 6.9.1 (citing Kim, supra note 34, at 763); See also
Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86
CALIF. L. REV. 241, 285 (1998) (“Corporations . . . do not posses attributes of personal
autonomy or the capacity for intimate relationships often thought important to justify privacy
claims.”).
141. See Kim, supra note 34, at 792.
142. 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 273 (2015).
143. Sexton, supra note 83, at 484.
144. Id. at 480.
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Second, he notes that the rule must be sufficiently definite so that attorneys
and clients know when their communication is protected.145 The benefits
that led the Court in Upjohn to confer protection over communications with
employees—full communication and voluntary compliance—accrue at the
time of communication, whereas the costs of the privilege are speculative
and theoretical.146 Therefore, preferring over-inclusive rules is preferable to
under-inclusive rules.147
The fear of expanding privilege has its root in the function of
privilege as an exception to a general rule of disclosure. Peralta and its
progeny reasoned that an over inclusive rule extending privilege to former
witnesses would allow for the influence of witnesses who were essentially
third parties to the litigation.148 However, the subject-matter test does not
grant a formalistic privilege based merely on membership in a certain class
of individuals, as employees who did not have any involvement beyond
being a mere witness would not normally be given privilege in the first
place.149 Additionally, former employees that qualify under the Upjohn
principles will likely be those who “(1) posses[ed] decisionmaking (sic)
responsibility regarding the matter about which legal help is sought, (2)
[were] implicated in the chain of command relevant to the subject matter of
the legal services, or (3) [were] personally responsible for or involved in the
activity that might lead to liability for the corporation.”150 In this regard, a
former employee could have more commonality of interest than current
employees.151 Because the function of Upjohn was to ensure that the
corporation had access to a free flow of information, “[w]hat should be of

145. Id. at 484.
146. Id. at 484-85.
147. Id. at 484.
148. See Peralta v. Cendant Corp.,190 F.R.D. 38, 41 (D. Conn. 1999) (stating that
communication regarding facts developed during litigation had the “potential to influence a
witness to conform or adjust her testimony to such information, consciously or
unconsciously”).
149. See, e.g., D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. of S.F., 388 P.2d 700, 709 (1964)
(“When an employee has been a witness to matters which require communication to the
corporate employer’s attorney, and the employee has no connection with those matters other
than as a witness, he is an independent witness. . . . Where the employee’s connection with
the matter grows out of his employment to the extent that his report or statement is required
in the ordinary course of the corporation’s business, the employee is no longer an
independent witness, and his statement or report is that of the employer.”); see also Hickman
v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (holding that there was no attorney client privilege over
communications with an employee who was a “mere witness”).
150. Sexton, supra note 83, at 500.
151. See also In re Flonase Antitrust Litig., 879 F. Supp. 2d 454, 459 (E.D. Pa. 2012)
(holding that independent contracts may be “functional empoyees” in certain circumstances).
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concern is the status of that person at the time and in relation to the events
communicated.”152
Furthermore, there is a legitimate argument to be made that
attorneys should be allowed to communicate in confidence with former
employees prior to a deposition. While it is true that a former employee no
longer personifies the corporate entity, their testimony regarding knowledge
obtained within the scope of employment has the potential of implicating
the corporation. Part of an attorney’s responsibility is to provide guidance to
the client regarding the legal consequences of the client’s words.153 Without
the guidance of legal counsel, a former employee “may make unintended
admissions due to his lack of sophistication in the deposition process.”154
Finally, drawing the line between information-gathering
communications and counseling communications would often be
prohibitively difficult. The court in Petroleum Products protected predeposition orientation sessions in part on the reasoning that the attorneys
likely gathered information related to the representation during the
sessions.155 Thus, limiting privilege to the scope of “information gathering”
would muddy the waters rather than provide an easy guide for attorneys. As
Justice Rehnquist stated in Upjohn, “[a]n uncertain privilege is little better
than no privilege at all.”156
CONCLUSION
Extending the subject-matter test to cover communications between
a corporation’s attorney and former employee is preferable because it
allows for the corporation to make autonomous, fully informed legal
decisions. It also serves an instrumental purpose by encouraging
corporations to conduct self-evaluative investigations in order to stop or

152. Id.
153. E.g., Joel S. Feldman, Bank Liability for Securities Fraud, 107 BANKING L.J. 100,
108-09 (1990) (“Whether a witness includes or excludes certain terms of art to his deposition
may determine the outcome of a dismissal motion or impact significantly on settlement.”);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAW § 116 cmt. b. (AM. LAW INST. 2000)
(“Witness preparation may include rehearsal of testimony. A lawyer may suggest choice of
words that might be employed to make the witness’s meaning clear. However, a lawyer may
not assist the witness to testify falsely as to a material fact.”).
154. Susan J. Becker, Conducting Informal Discovery of a Party’s Former Employees:
Legal and Ethical Concerns and Constraints, 51 MD. L. REV. 239, 269 n.138 (1992).
155. In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prod. Antitrust Litig., 658
F.2d 1355, 1361 n.7 (9th Cir. 1981).
156. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
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prevent harmful activity.157 These advantages outweigh the possibility that a
“zone of silence”158 will result from protecting the communications.
Under the real-entity theory of corporations, it would make little
sense to impede the free flow of information within the corporation to its
legal advisors. Regardless of whether the individual holding the information
is currently in an active agency relationship, information gathered during
employment “belongs” to the corporation and might be attributable to the
corporation.159 When an attorney needs this information to give competent
representation, he should be able to talk with the former employee without
concern. This is precisely what the subject-matter test and the Upjohn
function analysis does with current employees.160
In the case of former employees, it is sufficient that (1) the
communication be made by a current or former employee, (2) to corporate
counsel, (3) regarding matters within the scope of the current or former
employee’s corporate duties, and (4) the current or former employee is
aware that he or she is communicating in order for the corporation to obtain
legal counsel.
Embracing the view that corporations are rights-bearing entities
with the right to make autonomous decisions regarding legal action allows a
workable framework for understanding why communication with
employees and former employees alike should be given privilege when the
communication concerns information within the scope of the individual’s
current or former employment. While the concept of extending autonomy to
a corporation may seem strange at first, it is no different than personifying
the corporate form through giving it rights to own property, exercise
religion, or make political donations.161 Giving a rights-based privilege to
corporate communications with counsel would correct the conceptual
fallacies that have developed under current doctrine and consequently
clarify the scope of privilege with a client entity’s former employees.

157. See id. at 392 (stating that corporate attorney–client privilege serves public interest
by allowing compliance with the “vast and complicated array of regulatory legislation”).
158. David Simon, The Attorney–Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE
L.J. 953, 956 (1956).
159. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 275 (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
160. See Sexton, supra note 83, at 479 (stating that it is “fruitless [to] attempt to base
doctrines of corporate attorney–client privilege on a simplistic conceptual identification of
who in the corporation most resembles an individual client. A strength of the functional
approach employed by the Upjohn Court is that . . . it focuses on the purposes of the
corporate privilege.”).
161. See Anita L. Allen, Rethinking the Rule Against Corporate Privacy Rights: Some
Conceptual Quandries for the Common Law, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 607, 638 (1987)
(proposing that a corporation could have a right to privacy if moral rights are seen as a
benefit of being an active corporate citizen).

